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Disclosure of Investment Information in Multiple Markets
Abstract
We study the effect of disclosure on firms’ investment decisions when a firm competes with an identical
competitor in (two) multiple markets and with limited investment resources. We focus on the case where
the information disclosure environment may differ by each market. Consistent with previous research in a
single Cournot competition, our results show that firms exert more aggressive investments under disclosure
than under nondisclosure in symmetric disclosure environments. Our results also show, however, that firms
exert less aggressive investments in a disclosure market than in a nondisclosure market if each market has
an asymmetric disclosure environment. This stems from the fact that firms must concentrate their limited
investment resources on a less competitive market, and multimarket contact allows firms to predict rival
firm’s competitive behavior.
Keywords: disclosure environment, multimarket contact, cost-reducing investment, Cournot
competition
1. Introduction
This study examines the impact of information disclosure on firms’ investment decisions when
firms face competition from the same competitor in multiple markets. There are many studies
addressing the impact of information disclosure on the product market. These studies suggest
that information disclosure is an important factor in efficient capital markets while the disclosed
information may be used by rival firms in competitive markets. For example, Bolton and Scharf-
stein (1990) analyze the situation in which disclosed information is used by investors to make
investment decisions and is also observed by competitors. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005)
note that while managers want to improve their reputation through transparent reporting, they are
concerned that proprietary information, such as business investments that represent the company’s
competitive advantage, may be used by competitors. This risk is one of the factors hindering
voluntary disclosure.
In a Cournot competition, disclosing information on production capacity is considered to have
a strategic effect and could cause a competitor’s quantity to vary, which may be beneficial to a
disclosing firm. Darrough (1993), for example, shows that for firms facing quantity competition,
disclosure of low-cost information increases its expected profits. In a vertical structure where
upstream companies sell products to downstream companies, Arya and Mittendorf (2011) clarify
that the product quantity increases by disclosing low supply prices; that is, the production capacity
of downstream companies increases. In this paper, we focus on cost-reducing investments to
realize high productivity and examine how the disclosure of investment information affects firms’
investment behavior.
Studies on the impact of cost-reducing investments in competitive markets include the follow-
ing. Brander and Spencer (1983) show that firms that use R&D strategically, not just for cost
reduction, cause an increase in investment and production. d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988),
who focus on the spillover effect of cost-reducing investments and joint investments, show that
investment has the strategic effect of changing the production quantity of competitors. Banerjee
and Lin (2003) examine the effects of downstream firms’ cost-reducing investment on upstream
supply pricing. However, these results are based on competition in one market. When firms face
competition in multiple markets, the impact of information disclosure on firm behavior may differ
from the strategic effect in a single market.
In recent years, management diversification and internationalization have progressed, and there
may be situations where the same competitors compete in multiple markets. Arya, Frimor, and
Mittendorf (2010) analyze the disclosure policy of proprietary information from multiple segment
firms. To prevent other companies from entering, firms do not disclose information on a spe-
cific segment but may disclose information in a firm that aggregates multiple segments. This is
because disclosing the favorable news of one segment may assert the unfavorable news of other
segments. Bose and Gupta (2016) analyze multi-market competition between chains versus inde-
pendent stores and show that the chain store is less aggressive than the independent store. As noted
in Darrough (1993, p. 556), “Action taken by the firm in one market might affect the equilibrium in
the other market.” In the situation where a firm faces competition in multiple markets, information
disclosure does not necessarily increase firms’ production and investment. Bulow, Geanakoplos,
and Klemperer (1985) show that the behavior of firms in the first market can change the strategy
of competitors in the second market by affecting their own marginal costs in the second market.
Whether action in the first market will incur costs or benefits in the second market depends on the
change in marginal costs in the second market and whether the competitors’ products are strategic
substitutes or strategic complements. Bernheim and Whinston (1990) examine how contact with
multiple markets affects firms’ cooperation in repeated competition and note that multimarket con-
tact could weaken the competition. Thus, competitive relationships in multiple markets may be
weakened by cooperation between companies.
As a study focusing on the level of information disclosure in a multimarket, Thomas andWillig
(2006) show that if there is monitoring imperfection, the impact of adverse shocks in one market
can be spread to other markets, and payoffs may be lower. On the other hand, Matsushima (2001)
considers a situation where a company has a long-term strategic relationship. He shows that, when
the competitor’s strategy cannot be completely observed, multimarket contact improves efficiency
and maintains the collusion of companies. To analyze the impact of information disclosure, we
assume that two firms that compete in quantity markets in multiple markets invest to reduce costs.
We focus on the case where the information disclosure environment differs depending on the
market, not on information imperfection. We verify how the disclosure of investment information
affects firms’ investment levels, production quantities, and expected profits. As a result of the
verification, we clarify that firms may increase their investment in the non-disclosure market rather
than the disclosure market. This result contrast with the conventional wisdom obtained in a single
Cournot market.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the structure of product
market competition and firm profits. In Section 3, the equilibrium is derived for each case: the dis-
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closure case where all firms are required to disclose their investment information in both multiple
markets, the non-disclosure case where there are no disclosure requirements in both markets, and
the asymmetric case when only one market is required to disclose firms’ investment information.
In Section 4, we compare the results in all cases and evaluate the effects of investment informa-
tion disclosure on firms’ behavior in multiple markets. Our concluding remarks are presented in
Section 5.
2. Model
Consider two independent markets, A and B, with two firms, 1 and 2, which are Cournot
duopolists in both markets. Two competing firms produce a homogenous product in each market.
Thus, the inverse demand functions for firm i (i, j ∈ 1, 2, i , j) in each market are represented as
follows:
pA = a − qAi − qA j,
pB = b − qBi − qB j,
where a and b denote the demand intercept for the products, and, qAi and qBi denote the outputs
of firm i in the markets A and B, respectively. Firm i can reduce its constant marginal costs cAi
and cBi with investments eAi and eBi. Thus, the marginal costs for firm i are CAi = cAi − eAi and
CBi = cBi − eBi in each market. To simplify, we assume that cAi = cBi = cA j = cB j = c and c < a, b.
Now, we can express firm i’s profit as follows:
pii =
[
a − qAi − qA j − [c − eAi]
]
qAi +
[
b − qBi − qB j − [c − eBi]
]
qBi − φi(eAi,, eBi), (1)
where φi(eAi,, eBi) is investment costs. We assume that φi(eAi,, eBi) = .5θ−1i (eAi + eBi)
2 and param-
eter θi = θ j = θ > 0, which captures investment efficiency: the higher (lower) the θ, the lower
(higher) the investment costs.1 Again, the investment costs (i.e., the square of the sum of the two
investments) represent that investments in both markets are substitutes: a high investment level
in market A(B) leads to a high investment cost in market B(A). In some cases, the selection and
concentration of investments may be required.
To focus on the investment information, we assume that all other components are common
knowledge except the investment levels, which can be observed only if the disclosure regime in
each market requires both firms to disclose investment information.
We posit a three-stage game. At Stage 0, we determine the disclosure regimes in market A
and B, so firm i is required to either disclose its investment information in each market or not. At
Stage 1, firm i chooses investment levels to reduce their marginal costs, eAi and eBi, in each market.
Finally, firm i chooses output levels qAi and qBi in each market at Stage 2. Then, the profits for
each firm are realized.
1To ensure that all values in our results are positive, we restrict the degree of investment efficiency. For details, see
Section 3.3.
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Stage 0−→ −→ Stage 1−→ −→ Stage 2
disclosure regime of each each firm chooses their each firm chooses
market is determined. investments levels in each market. outputs levels in each market.
Table 1: Model Timeline
3. Analysis
We solve firm i’s maximization problem through backward induction. At Stage 2, firm i
chooses outputs levels of each market to maximize its profit, pii. Differentiating Eq. (1) with
respect to outputs qAi and qBi, we obtain the reaction functions as follows:
qAi =
a − c + eAi − qˆA j
2
, (2)
qBi =
b − c + eBi − qˆB j
2
, (3)
where qˆA j and qˆB j denote firm i’s conjectures regarding firm j’s outputs in market A and B, respec-
tively. Firm i’s conjectures will be consistent with firm j’s outputs if firm j’s investment infor-
mation is observable; otherwise, firm i must guess j’s outputs levels. We assume that both firms’
conjectures are formed rationally and will be sustained in equilibrium without revising conjectures
when the firms cannot directly observe the other firm’s investment information.2
3.1. disclosure case
To investigate how disclosure regimes affect firms’ investment and quantities decisions in mul-
timarkets, we first study a disclosure case where firms are required to disclose their investment
information in both markets A and B. In this case, firm i can use rival j’s investment levels to
determine its own outputs levels. Considering that rival j can also observe firm i’s investment
levels, we can replace qˆA j and qˆB j in Eqs. (2) and (3) with qA j and qB j. Now, we can obtain the
equilibrium outputs levels at Stage 2 as follows:
qAi(eAi, eA j) =
a − c
3
+
2eAi − eA j
3
, (4)
qBi(eBi, eB j) =
b − c
3
+
2eBi − eB j
3
. (5)
Thus, we show that firm i’s outputs increase with its own investments eAi and eBi but decrease with
rival j’s investments eA j and eB j. Each firm can alter its rival’s output levels through investment.
2Rey and Verge´ (2004) referred to this assumption as “passive beliefs,” arguing that these beliefs present a natural
restriction on potential equilibria. This assumption does not allow firms to revise their beliefs about rivals’ infor-
mation. Specifically, the authors show that passive beliefs in Cournot competition coincide with alternative beliefs,
which allows firms to revise their beliefs about rivals’ unobservable information.
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Substituting Eqs. (4) and (5) into firm i’s profit, we can represent firm i’s maximization prob-
lem at Stage 1, as follows:
max
eAi,eBi
pii =
[
a − qAi(eAi, eA j) − qA j(eA j, eAi) − [c − eAi]
]
qAi(eAi, eA j)
+
[
b − qBi(eBi, eB j) − qB j(eB j, eBi) − [c − eBi]
]
qBi(eBi, eB j) − 12θ [eAi + eBi]
2. (6)
This implies that firm i must consider the effects of investments eAi and eBi on rival j’s outputs qA j
and qB j as well as its own outputs qAi and qBi. Solving the above maximization problem, we can
obtain the equilibrium investment levels, the equilibrium outputs levels, and the expected profits
in a disclosure case. This leads to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. In the disclosure case, the equilibrium investment levels, the equilibrium outputs
levels, and the expected profits for firm i are
eDDAi =
9(b − a) + 4θ(a − c)
2(9 − 2θ) ,
eDDBi =
9(a − b) + 4θ(b − c)
2(9 − 2θ) ,
qDDAi = q
DD
Bi =
3(a + b − 2c)
2(9 − 2θ) ,
piDDi =
(9 − 4θ)(a + b − 2c)2
2(9 − 2θ)2 ,
where the superscripts, “DD”, denote disclosure regimes in each market; first for market A and
second for market B, and D indicates that firms are required to disclose their investment informa-
tion in the relevant market.
Proposition 1 shows that the equilibrium investment levels eAi(eBi) may decrease with the demand
intercept a(b) of its relevant market but increase with the demand intercept b(a) of another market
if investment efficiency is not considerably high (i.e., high investment costs). In a single Cournot
duopoly market, we can expect that firms are willing to exert more investment to increase their
own output and decrease their rival’s output as market demand grows because firms’ outputs are
strategic substitutes, and the cost-reducing investment accelerates strategic substitutes. In multiple
markets, however, substitutability of multiple investments requires firms to select and concentrate
their limited investment resources in one of the markets. Suppose that market A’s demand inter-
cept, a, is high, firm imay expect that rival j chooses an aggressive investment level, eA j, in market
A. The increase of rival j’s investment in market A imposes two conflicting effects on firm i: (i)
a decrease in investment, eAi, which has a negative effect for firm i in market A by decreasing its
output, qAi. (ii) A reduction in investment cost for eBi has a positive effect on firm i in market B.
The positive effect is greater than the negative effect only if investment efficiency is sufficiently
low such as 0 < θ < 9/4.3 In this sense, firm i is likely to concentrate its investment on market
3See the reaction function of investment at Stage 1, as follows:
eAi =
4θ(a − c) − 4θeA j − 9eBi
9 − 8θ , eBi =
4θ(b − c) − 4θeB j − 9eAi
9 − 8θ
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B to avoid competition in market A. Above equilibrium investment levels, eAi(eBi), however, pos-
itive values may not be maintained when the relevant market demand, a(b), is substantially larger
than the other market demand, b(a), because firms must respond to its rival’s excessive investment
level in the relevant market. To focus on positive investment levels, we assume that the difference
between demand intercepts, a and b, is sufficiently small.
On the other hand, the equilibrium investment levels, eAi(eBi), may increase with the relevant
market demand intercept, a(b), when investment efficiency is considerably high (i.e., low invest-
ment costs) such as 9/4 < θ. In this case, as market demand, a, increases, low investment costs
allow firms to make a more aggressive investment on market A against their rivals because it is not
necessary to select and concentrate their investment resources. The excessive increase in invest-
ment leads to intensive competition in market A but also imposes extremely high investment costs
on market B as well as A. Thus, firms may not obtain a positive profit. Note that firm i’s profit
is yielded from pii = q2Ai + q
2
Bi − φi (eAi, eBi). Again, the second-order conditions for investments
require us to restrict to θ < 9/8. We focus on cases in which the positive investment levels and the
second-order conditions are satisfied.
3.2. non-disclosure case
Next, we study a nondisclosure case where there are no disclosure regimes in both markets; that
is, firms do not disclose their investment information and rivals?investment levels are unobservable
in both markets. In this case, firm imust guess rival j’s outputs to determine its own outputs levels,
as follows:
qˆA j =
a − c + eˆA j − qˆAi
2
, (7)
qˆB j =
b − c + eˆB j − qˆBi
2
, (8)
where eˆA j and eˆB j are firm i’s conjectures regarding rival j’s investment levels. Again, firm i must
guess rival j’s conjectures qˆAi and qˆBi regarding outputs, qAi and qBi, as follows:
qˆAi =
a − c + eˆAi − qˆA j
2
, (9)
qˆBi =
b − c + eˆBi − qˆB j
2
. (10)
Solving with Eqs. (2) and (3) for reaction functions and the above conjectures simultaneously, we
obtain the equilibrium output levels at Stage 2, as follows:
qAi(eAi) =
a − c
3
+
3eAi − 2eˆA j + eˆAi
6
, (11)
qBi(eBi) =
b − c
3
+
3eBi − 2eˆB j + eˆBi
6
. (12)
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These show that the firm i’s outputs respond only to its own investment, not rival j’s actual invest-
ment.
Substituting Eqs. (11) and (12) into firm i’s profit, we can represent firm i’s maximization
problem at Stage 1, as follows:
max
eAi,eBi
pii =
[
a − qAi(eAi) − qˆA j − [c − eAi]
]
qAi(eAi)
+
[
b − qBi(eBi) − qˆB j − [c − eBi]
]
qBi(eBi) − 12θ [eAi + eBi]
2. (13)
This implies that firm i does not consider the effects of investments, eAi and eBi, on its rival’s
outputs, qA j and qB j. Differentiating the above maximization problem with respect to eAi and
eBi, and using the assumption that all conjectures are formed rationally and will be sustained in
equilibrium, we can obtain the equilibrium investment levels, the equilibrium outputs levels, and
the expected profits in a nondisclosure case. This leads to Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. In the non-disclosure case, the equilibrium investment levels, the equilibrium out-
puts levels, and the expected profits for firm i are
eNNAi =
3(b − a) + θ(a − c)
6 − θ ,
eNNBi =
3(a − b) + θ(b − c)
6 − θ ,
qNNAi = q
NN
Bi =
a + b − 2c
6 − θ ,
piNNi =
(4 − θ)(a + b − 2c)2
2(6 − θ)2 ,
where N indicates that firms’ investment information is not disclosed in the relevant market.
As in Proposition 1, the investment level in each market decreases with the demand intercept of its
own market but increases with that of another market if investment efficiency is not considerably
high (i.e., 0 < θ < 9/8). This stems from the belief that rival j is likely to choose an aggressive
investment level, eA j, in market A and a low investment level, eB j, in market B if market A’s demand
intercept, a, is high. In such case, firm i is willing to concentrate a high level of investment in
market B to avoid competition in market A even if firm i cannot observe rival j’s investment levels.
3.3. asymmetric case
Finally, we study an asymmetric case in which market A requires firms to disclose their invest-
ment information while market B has no claim on disclosure. In this case, observable investment
levels in market A allow firms to replace qˆAi = qAi and qˆBi = qBi, whereas firm imust guess rival j’s
output, qB j, to determine its output level, qBi, in market B. Given this, we find that the equilibrium
output levels, qAi and qBi, are consistent with Eq. (4) in the disclosure case and Eq. (12) in the
nondisclosure case at Stage 2, respectively.
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Substituting Eqs. (4) and (12) into firm i’s profit, we can represent firm i’s maximization
problem at Stage 1, as follows:
max
eAi,eBi
pii =
[
a − qAi(eAi, eA j) − qA j(eA j, eAi) − [c − eAi]
]
qAi(eAi, eA j)
+
[
b − qBi(eBi) − qˆB j − [c − eBi]
]
qBi(eBi) − 12θ [eAi + eBi]
2. (14)
This implies that firm i considers the effects of investment on rival j’s output only in market A
in which there is a requirement to disclose. Differentiating the above maximization problem with
respect to eAi and eBi, and using the assumption that all conjectures are formed rationally and
will be sustained in equilibrium, we can obtain the equilibrium investment levels, the equilibrium
outputs levels, and the expected profit in an asymmetric case. This leads to Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. In the asymmetric case, the equilibrium investment levels, the equilibrium outputs
levels, and the expected profit for firm i are
eDNAi =
3(3b − 4a + c) + 4θ(a − c)
21 − 4θ ,
eDNBi =
3(4a − 3b − c) + 4θ(b − c)
21 − 4θ ,
qDNAi =
3(a + b − 2c)
21 − 4θ ,
qDNBi =
4(a + b − 2c)
21 − 4θ ,
piDNi =
(4 − θ)(a + b − 2c)2
2(6 − θ)2 ,
where the superscripts “DN” denote disclosure regimes in each market; that is, firms are required
to disclose only in market A.
Note that results eDNBi and q
DN
Bi in the nondisclosure market can be replaced with e
ND
Ai and q
ND
Ai
in an asymmetric case when only market B requires disclosure. Proposition 3 also shows that
the investment levels in each market decrease with the demand intercept of its own market but
increases with the demand intercept of another market in the range of 0 < θ < 9/8. This implies
that firms are likely to avoid market competition in any case of multimarket contact regardless of
whether a rival’s investment information is observable.
Again, our results indicate that equilibrium investment levels may be negative values when
investment efficiency is not considerably low. Suppose that θ is extremely low such as θ → 0.
In this case, firms are not likely to choose positive investment levels because the investment costs
are extremely high. Firm i does not respond to rival j’s investment levels when choosing its
investment levels because the expectation is that rival j cannot maintain the investment at a positive
level. Thus, firm i considers only the effect on investment cost for another market. This leads
firms to choose negative investment levels if possible. To focus on positive investment levels, we
assume that investment efficiency is not considerably high or low so that the following condition
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is satisfied:
12a − 9b − 3c
4(a − c) < θ <
9
8
.
Now, we can compare all possible firm investment levels, output levels, and profits in multimar-
kets.
4. Results
In this section, we evaluate the effects of investment information disclosure in multimarkets.
Considering our assumption concerning the difference between demand intercepts, a and b, and
investment efficiency, θ, we can compare the investment levels, output levels, and expected profits
of each case in Section 3. This leads to Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. In multimarkets,
(i). Investment levels and output levels are
eDNAi
(
eNDBi
)
≤ eNNAi
(
eNNBi
)
≤ eDDAi
(
eDDBi
)
≤ eNDAi
(
eDNBi
)
,
qDNAi
(
qNDBi
)
≤ qNNAi
(
qNNBi
)
≤ qDDAi
(
qDDBi
)
≤ qNDAi
(
qDNBi
)
.
(ii). Expected profits are
piDDi ≤ piDNi ≤ piNNi .
We find that investment levels are higher when both markets require disclosure than when both
markets have no regimes (i.e., eNNAi ≤ eDDAi and eNNBi ≤ eDDBi ). This leads to an increase in out-
put levels (i.e., qNNAi ≤ qDDAi and qNNBi ≤ qDDBi ). As previous research shows, in a single Cournot
duopoly market, competing firms are willing to choose greater output levels as strategic substi-
tutes, and disclosing private cost information has a strategic effect that shifts a rival’s output.4 As
stated before, in our model, disclosure allows cost-reducing investment to reduce a rival’s output
in addition to increasing a firm’s own output in each relevant market. Therefore, firms choose
higher investment levels when both markets require disclosure. This leads to greater output lev-
els but higher investment costs. Furthermore, substitutability of multiple investment exacerbates
investment costs. Consequently, firms obtain less profit in both disclosure markets than in both
nondisclosure markets (i.e., piDDi ≤ piNNi ). This leads to Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Firms choose higher investment levels when both markets require disclosure of
firms’ investment information than when both markets have no disclosure regime.
4See Darrough (1993) and Hughes and Williams (2008).
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In contrast to previous research, however, our results provide two interesting insights. First, our
findings indicate that firms choose lower investment levels in a disclosure market than in a nondis-
closure market (i.e., eDNAi ≤ eNNAi or eNDBi ≤ eNNBi ) if the other market is under nondisclosure. This
stems from multimarket contact and investments substitutability. Note that firms must reduce their
investment in one market to concentrate on the other market. Suppose that only market A requires
firms to disclose investment information in our asymmetric case. It is expected that rival firm j
chooses a lower investment level in nondisclosure market B to choose a higher level in disclosure
market A. In this case, firm i is likely to reduce its investment in disclosure market A to concentrate
on nondisclosure market B (i.e., eDNAi ≤ eNNAi = eNNBi ≤ eDNBi ) because more profit is expected in a less
competitive market B where rivals have low investment levels. This leads to a decrease in output
in market A and an increase in output in market B (i.e., qDNAi ≤ qNNAi = qNNBi ≤ qDNBi ). However, firms
obtain less profit in an asymmetric case than in a symmetric nondisclosure case (i.e., piDNi ≤ piNNi )
because intensive competition in nondisclosure market B exacerbates investment costs. Second,
investment levels in a nondisclosure market are higher than in a disclosure market (i.e., eDDAi ≤ eNDAi
or eDDBi ≤ eDNBi ). Similarly, it is expected that a rival firm j chooses a lower investment level in
nondisclosure market B than in disclosure market A if only market A is required to disclose firms’
information. Therefore, firm i is likely to raise its investment on a nondisclosure market B and
avoid a more competitive (disclosure) market A (i.e., eDNAi ≤ eDDAi = eDDBi ≤ eDNBi ). This leads to a de-
crease in output in market A and an increase in output in market B (i.e., qDNAi ≤ qDDAi = qDDBi ≤ qDNBi ).
Consequently, firms obtain more profit in an asymmetric case than in a symmetric disclosure case
(i.e., piDDi ≤ piDNi ) because less intensive competition in disclosure market B diminishes investment
costs. These results lead to Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. Multimarket contact encourages firms to choose higher investment levels in a
nondisclosure market than in a disclosure market when the investment resources are restricted.
In multiple markets, investments substitutability makes firms select and concentrate their limited
resources on one market. Multimarket contact allows firms to predict rival firm’s behavior in
Cournot competition although this leads to unpredicted consequences for firms. Our results imply
that firms are likely to compete in an invisible market compared with a visible market to avoid a
more competitive market and to concentrate resources in a less competitive market.
5. Concluding Remarks
We examined the effect of disclosure on firms’ investment decisions when firms compete with
an identical competitor in multiple markets and with limited investment resources. We showed that
firms exert more investments in both symmetric disclosure markets than in both symmetric nondis-
closure markets. However, our results also showed that firms exert less investments in a disclosure
market than in a nondisclosure market if each market has an asymmetric disclosure regime (i.e.,
disclosure or nondisclosure). This result contrasts with the conventional wisdom obtained from a
single Cournot market. This wisdom stems from the belief that firms prefer to avoid a more com-
petitive market and concentrate their limited investment resources in a less competitive market,
and multimarket contact allows firms to predict rival firms’ behavior in Cournot competition.
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Finally, several of our assumptions may raise concerns about the generalizability of our results.
We assumed that multiple investments are perfect substitutes; one unit of one investment requires
exactly one unit of another investment cost for simplicity. This narrows down the generalizability
of our results and requires additional assumptions concerning investments substitutability. Again,
we assumed that the disclosure regime in each market is based on the situation whether disclosed or
not. This may exclude several issues for information disclosure, such as the extent of information
requirements, disclosure of aggregated information, and alternative information. These concerns
reveal several possible extensions for unveiling firms’ behavior in multimarket competition in
accounting research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Differentiating Eq. (6) for firm i’s maximization problem at Stage 1 with respect to eAi and eBi
yields a reaction function for each market as follows:
eAi =
4θ(a − c) − 4θeA j − 9eBi
9 − 8θ , (A.1)
eBi =
4θ(b − c) − 4θeB j − 9eAi
9 − 8θ . (A.2)
Solving the above equations simultaneously, we can obtain equilibrium investment levels eDDAi and
eDDBi , which leads to results in Proposition 1.
Again, we can show how equilibrium investment levels in both disclosure markets respond to
relevant market demand or other market demand as follows:
∂eDDAi (e
DD
Bi )
∂a(b)
= − 9 − 4θ
18 − 4θ , (A.3)
∂eDDAi (e
DD
Bi )
∂b(a)
=
9
18 − 4θ . (A.4)
Proof of Proposition 2.
Differentiating Eq. (13) for firm i’s maximization problem at Stage 1 with respect to eAi and
eBi yields a reaction function for each market as follows:
eAi =
2θ(a − c) + θeˆAi − 2θeˆA j − 6eBi
3(2 − θ) , (A.5)
eBi =
2θ(b − c) + θeˆBi − 2θeˆB j − 6eAi
3(2 − θ) . (A.6)
Our assumption that all conjectures are formed rationally and will be sustained in equilibrium
without revising conjectures allows us to replace eˆAi = eAi, eˆBi = eBi, eˆA j = eA j and eˆB j = eB j.
Solving four replaced reaction functions simultaneously, we can obtain equilibrium investment
levels, eNNAi and e
NN
Bi , which leads to the results in Proposition 2.
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Again, we show how equilibrium investment levels in both nondisclosure markets respond to
relevant market demand or other market demand as follows:
∂eNNAi (e
NN
Bi )
∂a(b)
= −3 − θ
6 − θ , (A.7)
∂eNNAi (e
NN
Bi )
∂b(a)
=
3
6 − θ . (A.8)
Proof of Proposition 3.
In an asymmetric case, the reaction function in a disclosure market A is consistent with (A.1),
and the reaction function in a nondisclosure market is consistent with (A.6). Similarly, we can
replace eˆBi = eBi and eˆB j = eB j and obtain equilibrium investment levels eDNAi and e
DN
Bi by solving
four reaction functions simultaneously. This leads to the results in Proposition 3.
Again, we can show how equilibrium investment levels in asymmetric markets respond to
relevant market demand or other market demand as follows:
∂eDNAi (e
ND
Bi )
∂a(b)
= −12 − 4θ
21 − 4θ , (A.9)
∂eDNAi (e
ND
Bi )
∂b(a)
=
8
21 − 4θ . (A.10)
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